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Blocking Progress: The IMF and HIV/AIDS
R I C K  R O W D E N
ActionAid International USA
In many low-income countries, HIV/AIDS activists and broader networks of
public health and education advocates have been increasingly frustrated by the
inability of their countries to spend more on the public health and education
systems generally, and on the additional doctors, nurses and teachers projected
to be needed to fight HIV/AIDS effectively or achieve other Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. The Joint Learning Initiative on Human
Resources for Health and Development, a global study of health workforces,
found that to provide the essential health interventions required to achieve the
MDGs will require Africa to increase its health workforce by at least 1m addi-
tional doctors, nurses, and midwives over the current level of 600,000 health
care workers.1 A similar study by the World Health Organization found that for
essential health services to be provided, sub-Saharan Africa needs a total of 2.5m
additional health care workers.2
Yet such spending increases are not at all possible under the current eco-
nomic policy choices. Most health and education ministries only have the
budgets granted by their finance ministries, and in turn, the finance ministries
explain that budgets are in line with the fiscal and monetary policy targets
agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Most low-income countries are under pressure to stay ‘on track’ with their IMF
programs, as its essential for also accessing World Bank money or aid from the
other major multilateral or bilateral donors and creditors. By playing such a gate-
keeper role to all other foreign aid, the IMF’s ‘signal effect’ has given it tremen-
dous power beyond the amount of money in its loans. The fundamental problem
is that under current IMF policy choices and spending constraints, many coun-
tries will not be able to increase expenditures or public investment in line with
what is projected to be needed to fight HIV/AIDS or achieve the MDGs.
A flashpoint of controversy in recent years has been over the IMF’s use of
ceilings or caps on the wages for all public sector employees in the budget as
among its binding loan conditions. When enforced, the national wage bill
ceilings consequently constrain the levels of wages available for each of the
sector budgets, including for health personnel. Therefore, even when donors
are willing to finance personnel costs, such as increased salaries or new health
care worker posts, countries may be prevented from using such funds because
of the IMF’s spending limits on wages. As the wage ceilings have made plan-
ning for ambitious scaling-up of health personnel all but impossible, the IMF
has become a lightening rod for unwanted attention. The same is true for edu-
cation advocates seeking to hire more teachers.3
In 2004, the IMF wage bill ceiling collided with a bold UK initiative to fund
Malawi’s national Emergency Human Resources Plan, an important step that
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broke with common donor practice by funding the recurrent expenses associ-
ated with increasing salaries of domestic health care workers and creating new
posts. When the IMF objected, it was negotiated and finally agreed the wage
ceiling could be lifted to accommodate the money spent on personnel if done
slowly over six years. Recently, the IMF has attempted to placate critics with
a July 2007 claim it will now back away from its widespread use of the wage
ceilings, but may still use them as it deems necessary.4
Unfortunately, both the ingenuity shown by the UK to spend on wages and
the ‘flexibility’ on wage ceilings by the IMF in the Malawi case are the excep-
tions and not the rule. Generally, aid donors are unwilling to commit funds
for recurrent wages, and the IMF reinforces this by raising concerns about
potential macroeconomic problems that could result from entering into long-
term expenditure commitments without long-term donor commitments to
finance them. Donors should, however, follow the UK’s enlightened lead by
planning for longer-term aid commitments and making resources explicitly
available for personnel salaries.
WHAT DO FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES HAVE TO DO WITH
GETTING MORE DOCTORS, NURSES AND TEACHERS HIRED?
Although the wage bill ceilings have been the focus of much attention and ire,
and the unpredictability of future donor aid commitments is also a legitimate
concern, both are merely symptoms of the deeper underlying problem of
chronically insufficient national and sector budgets generally. Keeping wages
constrained is just a subset of the larger IMF goal of reducing or keeping over-
all national public expenditure constrained. The two key policies used to
achieve this goal are the fiscal policy (deficit-reduction targets) and monetary
policy (inflation-reduction targets) in the macroeconomic framework of the
IMF loan programs.
These two policies can directly impact the GDP growth rate for the 
whole economy (and thus the amount of taxes raised and public expenditure
available) and how much foreign aid can be absorbed and spent in a year.
HIV/AIDS, health and education advocates who are trying to get more doc-
tors, nurses and teachers hired must understand how these two key fiscal
and monetary policies will be essential to achieving their advocacy goals for
increased public expenditure.
The main two problems are that the IMF’s unnecessarily restrictive deficit-
reduction and inflation-reduction targets are creating a monumental bottleneck
that is preventing countries from: (1) being able to fully utilize all of the increas-
ing levels of foreign aid that have become available in recent years; and, (2) being
able to generate higher levels of expenditure domestically.
Regarding not fully using available donor aid, an April 2007 study of 29 sub-
Saharan African countries by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office found
that over 70% of the donor aid increases given to the countries between
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1999–2005 was redirected into building international currency reserves at the
central bank or paying down domestic debt in order to meet the strict IMF
monetary policies, while only 28% was actually allowed to be spent as
intended by donors.5 A recent study by the Washington, DC-based Center
for Global Development also found that donor aid flows for global health
were being undermined by IMF policies that are unnecessarily restrictive.6
Regarding not generating higher domestic expenditure, the IMF advises
countries to raise short-term interest rates in order to lower inflation, but this can
have the negative side-effect of slowing down GDP growth rates, employment
and public spending. Therefore, there is a trade-off in which the IMF prefers to
sacrifice higher GDP growth and spending in order to get lower inflation.
Serious health and education advocates today have no choice but to wade
into the murky world of abstract debates about the degree of restrictiveness of
the IMF’s fiscal and monetary targets, how they impact the size of national
budgets in poor countries, and possible alternatives.
No one wants policies that are too ‘loose’ or lead to large budget deficits or
high inflation rates, or policies that are too ‘tight’ or unnecessarily restrictive,
as these can constrain optimally higher GDP growth rates and public spend-
ing levels. In between these two extremes are what economists call ‘the gray
area’, or a range of still feasible alternative options that could allow for differ-
ing degrees of public expenditure and restraint. The IMF does not like to talk
about the existence of this range of alternatives.
Examples of possible ‘gray area’ alternatives were highlighted in an Oxfam
International report that took IMF deficit-reduction targets for a set of coun-
tries and suggested hypothetical projections for how much more public
spending countries could have engaged in had they been allowed to pay down
their deficits more slowly. The outcomes were striking, in some cases
enabling a doubling of health and education sector budgets.7
Each option within this ‘gray area’ range of feasible alternatives has its own
short-term and long-term costs and benefits, all of which could be discussed,
assessed and debated by key public stakeholders, such as health and education
ministry staff, relevant legislative committees and civil society. However, in
most low-income countries, such inclusive discussions of ranges of alternative
policy scenarios have not been the case. Usually the IMF meets periodically
with central bank and finance ministry officials from borrowing countries
behind closed doors, where it insists on extremely restrictive policies. The
problem is that the IMF insists its preference is the only option, and officials
tend to go along with this.
25 YEARS OF RESTRICTIVE SPENDING POLICIES
The IMF’s position has become the dominant orthodoxy in develop-
ment economics, but this was not always the case. In the early 1980s, former
US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
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transformed the IMF and World Bank by eliminating the Keynesian econo-
mists, who believed in a key role for the state in modulating economic policies,
and replaced these staff with the neoliberal economists who favored free trade
and free markets over state intervention. At the IMF in particular, a subset of
neoliberal economists called ‘monetarists’ rose in ascendancy, who believed
that inflation is always unacceptable and that budget deficits should not be
allowed. At this time, such extremely restrictive fiscal and monetary policies
were viewed as just one very conservative option along a range of other feasi-
ble possible policies, but as years went by, the IMF’s position has gained dom-
inance and is today widely believed to be the only option available to countries.
For over 25 years, leading think-tanks, university departments, textbook
publishers and corporate media have contributed to the perception that
extremely restrictive fiscal and monetary policies are not only ‘sound’ and ‘pru-
dent’, but also that they are the only option. (The dominance of these ideas has
remained true despite the apparent hypocrisy of rich countries, who still freely
adopt more expansionary monetary policies or countercyclical fiscal policies
when needed, but who do not allow developing countries to do so.)
Key tenets of the monetarism that informs IMF policies include that fiscal
deficits must be paid down to very low levels very quickly and that inflation
rates must be driven down into at least the 5% to 7% range in order to con-
stitute ‘macroeconomic stability’. However, this definition of stability is con-
tradicted by much other published research in the peer-reviewed economics
literature, which shows that moderately higher budget deficits and inflation
rates do not necessarily constitute ‘instability’.
Public health and education advocates should know and use this information –
that the IMF does not have the last word. They must step up investment in
macroeconomic literacy trainings for civil society, key legislative committee
members, health and education ministry staff and the media.
In borrowing countries, such training is essential for enabling advocates
to more forcefully engage with their finance ministries about what is being
agreed to with the IMF. Advocates must create public spaces where the
options for alternative, more expansionary spending policies can be pub-
licly discussed, debated and assessed, and in a transparent and accountable
way that can be done before the finance ministries sign on to future IMF
loan programs.
IF YOU’RE GOING TO SCALE-UP, YOU’LL NEED THE FISCAL AND
MONETARY POLICIES TO MATCH
Global advocacy networks are increasingly pressuring the IMF to change. An
example of this mounting pressure was expressed in an October 2007 global
NGO sign-on letter to Dominique Strauss-Khan, the incoming IMF
Managing Director, in which 125 organizations called on him to change these
unnecessarily restrictive policies that undermine developing countries’ ability
to increase health and education spending.8
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Because the richest countries dominate politics on the IMF Executive Board,
health and education advocates in the rich countries are also calling on their
governments to use their influence at the IMF to make formalized policy
changes and instruct staff to allow for looser fiscal and monetary policies.
Critics of the monetarist policies introduced by Reagan and Thatcher had
fought against them in the 1980s and 1990s, and lost both times. But today,
the global imperative to fight HIV/AIDS effectively and meet the MDGs
presents a new factor in the equation. The current policy incoherence of try-
ing to both scale-up spending with one hand while letting the IMF restrict
spending with the other is becoming increasingly untenable for growing
numbers of advocates who are demanding results.
The same over-zealous spending restraint that has been a hallmark of the
monetarists for 25 years may also end up being their Achilles heel in today’s
changing world, which is eager to see scaled-up public spending. In this sense,
the persistent political demands of emerging global social movements for
health and education may end up signaling the beginning of the end for the
reign of the monetarists at the IMF. If they keep pushing, these movements
can help open the way for use of the more expansionary fiscal and monetary
policies likely to be needed to enable a significant scaling-up of public invest-
ments in health, education and other national development goals in low-
income countries.
notes
1. ‘Joint Learning Initiative on Human Resources for Health and Development,
Human Resources for Health: Overcoming the Crisis (2004)’, pp. 33–4,
http://www.globalhealthtrust.org/Report.html
2. World Health Organization Press Release, 4 November 2004, ‘Preventing and
Treating HIV/AIDS in Poor Countries will Help Deliver Better Health Services
through 2005 and Beyond’, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/
2004/pr75/en/
3. ActionAid International Education Team, April 2007, ‘Confronting the
Contradictions: The IMF, Wage Bill Caps and the Case for Teachers’, http://
www.actionaidusa.org/imf_africa.php; For the IMF response: http://www.imf.
org/external/np/vc/2007/051707.htm; For ActionAid’s point-by-point rebuttal to
the IMF: http://www.actionaid.org/main.aspx?PageID=652
4. ‘IMF Executive Board Discusses Operational Implications of Aid Inflows for IMF
Advice and Program Design in Low-Income Countries’, Public Information
Notice (PIN) No. 07/83, 19 July 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/
2007/pn0783.htm
5. For the IEO report: http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/pdf/03122007/
report.pdf; For responses by alarmed aid advocates, see ActionAid’s newsletter:
http://www.actionaidusa.org/pdf/PoliciesandPriorities-IFIs-Spring2007issue-
1008.pdf
6. Center for Global Development, April 2007, Does the IMF Constrain Health
Spending in Poor Countries? Evidence and an Agenda for Action, http://www.cgdev.
org/doc/IMF/IMF_Report.pdf
GSP Forum 23
7. ‘The IMF and the Millennium Goals: Failing to Deliver for Low-Income
Countries’, Oxfam Briefing Paper, September 2003, p. 10. http://www.oxfam.
org/en/files/pp030917_imf_mdgs.pdf
8. For the letter, see http://www.africaaction.org/newsroom/docs/0710_CSO_
Letter_FINAL.pdf
RICK ROWDEN is Senior Policy Analyst at ActionAid International USA. Please address
correspondence to: Rick Rowden, ActionAid International USA, 1420 K Street NW,
Suite 900, Washington, DC 20005, USA. [email: Rick.Rowden@actionaid.org]
24 Global Social Policy 8(1)
